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2 SOCIAL REVERSAL LEARNING  
Abstract 
Reward properties of stimuli can undergo sudden changes, and the detection of these 
‘reversals’ is often made difficult by the probabilistic nature of rewards/punishments. Here we 
tested whether and how humans use social information (someone else’s choices) to overcome 
uncertainty during reversal learning. We show a substantial social influence during reversal 
learning, which was modulated by the type of observed behavior.  Participants frequently 
followed observed conservative choices (no switches after punishment) made by the 
(fictitious) other player but ignored impulsive choices (switches), even though the experiment 
was set up so that both types of response behavior would be similarly beneficial/detrimental 
(Study 1). Computational modeling showed that participants integrated the observed  choices 
as a ‘social prediction error’ instead of ignoring or blindly following the other player. 
Modeling also confirmed higher learning rates for ‘conservative’ versus ‘impulsive’ social 
prediction errors. Importantly, this ‘conservative bias’ was boosted by interpersonal 
similarity, which in conjunction with the lack of effects observed in a non-social control 
experiment (Study 2) confirmed its social nature. A third study suggested that relative 
weighting of observed impulsive responses increased with increased volatility (frequency of 
reversals). Finally, simulations showed that in the present paradigm integrating social and 
reward information was not necessarily more adaptive to maximize earnings than learning 
from reward alone. Moreover, integrating social information increased accuracy only when 
conservative and impulsive choices were weighted similarly during learning. These findings 
suggest that to guide decisions in choice contexts that involve reward reversals humans utilize 
social cues conforming with their preconceptions more strongly than cues conflicting with 
them, especially when the other is similar. 
  
3 SOCIAL REVERSAL LEARNING  
1. Introduction 
Adaptive behavior depends on learning and retaining associations between specific 
stimuli or responses on the one hand and positive or negative outcomes (reward or 
punishment) on the other. In a complex and dynamic environment organisms must also 
adequately respond to sudden changes in those associations and re-learn established 
contingencies. A widely used experimental tool to study this process in animals and humans is 
reversal learning (Cools, Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996; 
Jones & Mishkin, 1972). In a typical setup, human participants learn to choose one of two 
simple visual stimuli by receiving monetary rewards for correct responses (stimulus A) and 
being punished by monetary loss for incorrect responses (stimulus B). After a variable 
number of trials, these contingencies are reversed so that the participant will be rewarded for 
choosing B and be punished for choosing A. Trial-by-trial choices in this task can be 
predicted by the algorithms of reinforcement learning models which are based on the 
calculation of reward prediction errors (Jocham, Neumann, Klein, Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 
2009). 
1.1 Social information and decision-making 
Critically, in real-life situations learning of reward contingencies is not only achieved 
by trial-and-error and reward prediction errors but also by social learning, that is, by 
observing the choices of other agents who are exposed to the same or similar decisional 
contexts. In the majority of everyday choice situations (e.g. choosing between alternative 
products or services) social information is readily available either through behavioral 
observation of others or through active gathering of information (e.g. consumer reviews). 
Observational factors can be expected to become especially important if well-established 
behavioral choice routines need to be revised because the expected outcome is not received or 
experienced as less rewarding. In such situations the possibility of a change in the underlying 
reward probabilities (e.g., the quality of the usually preferred product/service has changed) 
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will evoke decisional uncertainty which is a potent trigger for ‘social reality testing’, that is, 
the reliance on others to resolve ambiguity (Festinger, 1950). The literature to date has 
ignored whether information about others' choices affects responding to sudden changes in 
reward properties of a stimulus as implemented in the reversal learning task. This is surprising 
given the evidence that other basic cognitive processes, such as perceptual judgments, can 
profoundly be shaped by social influence (Asch, 1956; Baron, Vandello, & Brunsman, 1996). 
Social influence can be governed, on the one hand, by socio-normative mechanisms, 
originating from the influenced person's motivation to gain social approval if the influencing 
person is present (as in Asch's classic line discrimination studies). On the other hand, it can 
also arise in the absence the influencing person and social pressure, being motivated by 
informational needs (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) and the wish to resolve ambiguity to optimize 
one's outcomes. Such informational social influence is likely to operate in choice decisions 
involving uncertain rewards and a few studies have begun to document social influences on 
probabilistic reward learning. However, these studies used fixed (Biele, Rieskamp, Krugel, & 
Heekeren, 2011; Burke, Tobler, Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010) or gradually changing (Behrens, 
Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Cooper, Dunne, Furey, & O’Doherty, 2012) reward 
contingencies rather than a setup involving unexpected reversals.  
1.2 Predictions for the use of social information during reversal learning 
The primary goal of the present studies was to explore the use of social information 
(observed choices by another agent) during reversal learning, specifically, how such social 
influence is mediated by the (i) type of observed choice behavior (conservative versus 
impulsive) and (ii) the similarity of the observed agent.  
The differentiation between conservative and impulsive choices during reversal 
learning arises as a result of the task-inherent combination of probabilistic reward and 
possibility of reversals. In other words, even if reward contingencies have not changed, 
correct choices are occasionally punished by monetary losses (so-called Probabilistic Errors, 
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ProbErrs). Consequently, after each punishment occurring against the background of correct 
responses an individual has to decide whether to switch to the other stimulus (taking the 
punishment as indicator of reversed contingencies) or whether to stay with their previous 
choice (taking the punishment as a ProbErr). Accordingly, choices in trials that immediately 
follow ProbErrs and reversals can be classified as reflecting either a conservative or an 
impulsive type of choice behavior. Stay responses correspond to conservative choices as the 
agent relies on accumulated information about a specific choice option – which has been 
gathered across a number of trials before the unexpected punishment – rather than trying a 
new option. This can be seen in analogy to an exploitative decision-making strategy in multi-
armed bandit problems, in which multiple choice options with varying pay-offs are available 
(Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007). Conversely, switch responses can be seen as impulsive 
choices (Fineberg et al., 2010), reflecting an abrupt change of choice behavior based on single 
events without consideration of the previous choice history. Importantly, adaptive behavior 
during reversal learning requires the dynamic use of both types of behavior. Although 
impulsive responses manifest as errors in the trial(s) after ProbErrs (= post-ProbErr choice) 
they lead to correct choices in the trials(s) after true reversal events. Vice versa, conservative 
responses increase accuracy after ProbErrs but lead to incorrect choices (‘perseverations’) 
after reversal events. The key question addressed in the present framework was whether 
observing someone else making conservative choices affects our own choices differently than 
observing someone else making impulsive choices.  
Diverging effects for observed conservative versus impulsive choices can be predicted 
from findings about the biased use of information during individual decision-making. Thus, it 
is possible that learners take into account only social information conforming to their 
preconception or expectation about the correct versus incorrect stimulus (established before 
the other player’s choice is observed). This preconception is based on the learner’s more 
frequently chosen stimulus in a given reversal episode and thus usually corresponds to a bias 
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towards conservative choices made by the observed other. Such selective use of social 
information would parallel a ‘confirmation’ bias described in the context of individual 
decision-making (Nickerson, 1998). Conversely, a social influence bias towards the other’s 
impulsive choices may arise if observational reversal learning is expectation-free but driven 
by the higher saliency of impulsive (switch) responses occurring against the stream of 
standard (non-switch) choices between two reversals. 
Apart from the type of observed choice behavior, the present studies aimed to examine 
social influence on reversal learning as a function of perceived similarity of the observed 
agent. Similarity has been shown to influence different cognitive processes across a wide 
range of phenomena, including decision-making (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Similarity is 
also effective in modulating a variety of social behaviors, ranging from the experience of 
vicarious reward (Mobbs et al., 2009) to cooperative behavior (Mussweiler & Ockenfels, 
2013). Pertinent to the present work, the behavior and opinions of similar versus dissimilar 
others are more likely to be imitated (Guéguen & Martin, 2009).  Moreover, requests from 
similar others are more likely to be complied with than requests from dissimilar others, 
suggesting that similarity directly affects the degree of social influence (Burger, 2004). 
With regard to the role of similarity, we thus hypothesized that any bias in the 
following of behavioral patterns of the observed agent should be exaggerated (i.e. social 
learning rates should be increased) if this person shares a characteristic feature with the 
observing agent. 
2. General Methods 
2.1 The social reversal learning task 
On each trial of the present task, participants observed the response of a (fictitious) 
other player before they were required to make their own choice. Reversal learning 
performance was assessed in two different blocks, examining choice behavior without 
(private/baseline block, Fig. 1A) and with (social block, Fig. 1B) exposure to the choices 
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made by a (fictitious) previous participant. In both blocks, participants learned to choose one 
of two simultaneously presented colors (‘blue’ and ‘green’) by receiving monetary reward (+1 
pence [p]) or punishment (-1p) contingent on their choice (e.g. +1p for ‘blue’ and -1p for 
‘green’). 
After a variable number of trials unknown to the participants, reward/punishment 
contingencies were reversed so that the previously rewarded stimulus was now punished and 
vice versa (-1p for ‘blue’ and +1p for ‘green’). A varying number (1-3) of ProbErrs was 
interspersed at random positions between two reversals so that a normally correct response 
was unexpectedly punished. The total number of reversal and ProbErr events was matched 
between the different conditions. Using ProbErr trials (and thus a ‘pseudo-probabilistic’ 
approach) rather than a truly probabilistic design (with correct choices being rewarded, for 
instance, with a probability of 0.9 and punished with a probability of 0.1) allowed us to 
control the number of punishments (and thus objective performance of the other player) 
across social conditions. Overall, the reward ratio in our pseudo-probabilistic setup (including 
1-3 punishments per 7-15 trials in Study 1) was comparable to a reward probability of 0.8/0.2, 
typically used in other probabilistic reward learning tasks.  
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Fig. 1. Design of the social reversal learning task illustrating one reversal episode. (A) Private 
condition. Crosses illustrate hypothetical choices. Feedback was given instantaneously after a choice 
had been made. A varying number of probabilistic errors showing ‘wrong’ feedback after correct 
choices were presented before each reversal. (B) The two social conditions involving the presentation 
of conservative versus impulsive choices made by a (fictitious) other player who either shared the 
same birthday as the participant (similar-other group) or not (dissimilar-other group). The other 
player’s choices were indicated by a white frame surrounding his/her choice before the real participant 
made his/her choice. Crosses show hypothetical choices reflecting imitative response behavior. Note 
that participants were exposed to choices made by ONE other player who displayed conservative AND 
impulsive choices in different reversal episodes. As illustrated, the number of errors made by the other 
player was balanced between the conservative and impulsive condition. 
 
2.2 Choice behavior and similarity of the other player 
In each trial of the social block, choices made by the other player were presented 
before participants made their own choice. (i) The first experimental manipulation concerned 
the response of the other player responded in the first trial (+1) after an unexpected 
punishment. We manipulated the other player's choices to simulate (a) ‘conservative’ (stay 
response) versus (b) ‘impulsive’ (switch response) choice behavior as described above (1.1). 
After each ProbErr in a given reversal episode (between two consecutive reversals) the other 
player consistently made either conservative (stay) or impulsive (switch) responses. The order 
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of conservative/impulsive reversal episodes was randomized with the constraint of yielding a 
specific number of episodes per condition (see Methods Study 1 and 2). Changing the other 
player’s choice behavior between episodes (but not within episodes) aimed to simulate 
dynamic changes in decision-making strategies as observed in natural contexts. In addition, 
after a few reversal events the conservative player perseverated to the previously rewarded 
stimulus for two or three trials after the reversal. Importantly, inclusion of these ‘social 
perseveration’ trials helped to balance the number of ‘errors’ (wrong choices) committed by 
the other player in the conservative versus impulsive condition: There were 30 observed 
conservative versus 20 observed impulsive errors in Study 1 and 12 conservative and 16 
impulsive errors in Study 2. Thus, overall following conservative versus impulsive choices 
was comparably beneficial/detrimental, with a slight disadvantage for conservative choices in 
Study 1 and the opposite pattern in the replication study (Study 2) so that any effects related 
to the objective performance of the other player were counterbalanced across the two studies. 
It should be noted that in contrast to previous studies (e.g. Burke et al., 2010), we did not 
manipulate and present outcomes of the observed player separately. Nonetheless, as 
participants were made to believe that the other player was exposed to the exact same 
reward/punishment contingencies, they could easily infer after each trial whether the observed 
choice was correct or incorrect. 
(ii) The second manipulation was based on an ‘incidental similarity’ technique 
(Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004) that allowed us to create an 
association between the participant and the observed agent without providing information 
relevant to the task: Before the social block participants were presented with a screen showing 
basic information about the other player (see Methods Study 1). For half of the participants, 
this information included a date of birth of the observed player matching the day and month 
of their own birthday (similar-other group), whereas for the other half the birthdays did not 
match (dissimilar-other group). Previous research has demonstrated that this manipulation 
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critically determines how information about others influences the self (Brown & Novick, 
1992).  
3. Study 1 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
34 volunteers participated in Study 1. Data from two participants were excluded due to 
the use of wrong response keys or non-compliance with instructions (remaining sample: 27 
female, 5 male; mean age M = 20.82 years, SD = 4.67). All participants (Studies 1 and 2) 
were members of Cardiff University who gave written informed consent to take part in the 
studies that had been approved by the School of Psychology’s Ethics Committee, Cardiff 
University. For taking part, participants received course credits or were paid £6 per hour.  
3.1.2 Materials and procedure 
The screen shown throughout the learning session consisted of two colored squares 
(blue and green) presented left and right of the center of the monitor on a black background. 
At all times, participants also could see their accumulated earnings (£), shown centrally below 
the colors and updated in each trial synchronously with the feedback. The beginning of each 
choice trial was indicated by the appearance of two (private block) or one (social block) white 
frame(s) surrounding (one of) the colors. These response cues remained on the screen until the 
participants made their choice by pressing the ‘1’ or ‘3’ key on the keyboard. A black cross 
inside the chosen colored square, shown for 500 ms after response onset, indicated the 
participant’s choice. Feedback was then given using a white ‘smiley’ (correct choice) or red 
‘frowny’ (incorrect choice), centrally presented for 1000 ms. Trials were separated by an 
Inter-Trial-Interval (ITI) randomly varying between 700 and 1400 ms. 
Private and social blocks were presented in counterbalanced order. The private block 
consisted of 12 reversal episodes (6 blue correct, 6 green correct episodes), containing a 
pseudo-randomized number of choice trials that varied between 7 and 15 between two 
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reversals (mean episode length = 11 trials). Within each reversal episode we included 1-3 
probabilistic error (ProbErr) trials in which ‘wrong’-feedback was given for correct choices 
(and ‘correct’-feedback for wrong choices), even though the reward contingencies had not 
changed. Across the 12 reversal episodes, we presented 20 ProbErr trials, with 6 episodes 
containing only 1 ProbErr, 4 episodes containing 2 ProbErrs and 2 episodes containing 3 
ProbErrs in random order. Within a reversal episode, ProbErrs could occur at a random 
position between the third trial after the previous reversal and two trials before the next 
reversal. We implemented the same trial structure as above in the social block so that each 
condition was matched with regard to the number of choice trials and the number of ProbErrs. 
The social block comprised 36 reversal episodes. Before the social block participants received 
written instructions that they would now be able to observe what an anonymous other player – 
who received exactly the same learning sequence as they – chose in a previous study. 15 of 
the participants were presented with a similar player and 17 with a dissimilar player (see 
below). 
In trials after reversals the other player made impulsive (= correct) choices in 24 of the 
36 reversal episodes while in the other 12 episodes he/she made conservative choices, 
perseverating to the previously rewarded color for 2 (6 episodes) or 3 (6 episodes) trials and 
leading to a total of 30 social perseveration trials. Vice versa for +1 trials after ProbErrs, 
participants observed conservative choices of the other player in 24 episodes and impulsive 
choices in the 12 other episodes. The order of episodes with conservative versus impulsive 
choices was freely randomized. In ProbErr and reversal trials, the other player always 
responded incorrectly. Except for ProbErr/reversal trials and the trials after ProbErrs/reversals 
(+1 and perseveration trials), the other player always responded correctly (standard trials). 
3.1.3 Social cover story and similarity manipulation  
Before the social block, participants were instructed to initiate a ‘random generator’ on 
the computer that selected a specific participant from a (fictitious) other study, showing a 
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rapid sequence of ‘subject codes’ (e.g. PJ_008) that seemingly stopped at a random point. 
Participants were told that they would see choices made by the selected participant and 
received some basic information about the other player on the screen. Based on a pre-
experimental demographic questionnaire, the experimenter had manipulated this information 
shortly before testing while the participants had been waiting in a separate room. It included 
(i) the other player’s ‘gender’ (either ‘male’ or ‘female’ and always matching the participant’s 
own gender), ‘date of data collection’ in the previous study (always ‘3 Nov 2010’), and (iii) 
the other player’s birthday. While the birth year was always ‘1989’, the other player’s day and 
month of birth was manipulated to either match the real player’s birthday or not (default 
birthday: ‘25 Apr’).  
3.1.4 Data analysis 
3.1.4.1 Accuracy analysis 
We assessed social influences on reversal learning by calculating for each participant 
trial-based average accuracy scores (% choices corresponding to the correct color of each 
reversal episode) as a function of condition (private, conservative and impulsive) and relative 
trial position within a reversal episode. For calculating accuracy scores for trials surrounding 
critical events (ProbErrs or reversals), only trials were included that were unaffected by a 
second ProbErr or reversal either in the preceding trial, in the trial before the preceding trial or 
in the trial directly following the target trial. 
As shown in Fig. 3, apparent differences between the private, conservative and 
impulsive conditions occurred only in the first two trials (+1, +2) after ProbErr or reversal 
events, that is, there were no accuracy (switch/stay tendency) differences between the private 
versus social conditions in standard trials. We used planned comparisons (one-tailed paired t-
tests) in post-ProbErr trials +1 and +2 to test for accuracy increases in the conservative 
condition and accuracy decreases in the impulsive condition, respectively, relative to the 
private condition. We tested for the opposite pattern (accuracy decrease in conservative, 
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accuracy increase in impulsive condition) in post-reversal trials +1 and +2. Importantly, by 
measuring social influence in the conservative versus impulsive condition as a combined 
pattern of accuracy increase and decrease, any global performance difference between the 
private and social block was unlikely to confound the present effects. Effect sizes for 
significant differences between the two social conditions and the private condition were 
calculated using Cohen’s d for paired samples (d = D / SDD, where D is the mean difference 
score and SDD is the standard deviation of the difference scores). 
3.1.4.2 Computational modeling 
In addition to analyses of choice behavior averaged across trials, we used 
computational modeling to investigate the relative contribution of reward-based and social 
trajectories to drive single-trial choices. Specifically, we tested how well standard 
reinforcement learning algorithms (Q-learning; Watkins & Dayan, 1992) predicted individual 
choices in the social block and compared this to several social Q-learning variants that we 
developed to model observational factors.  
Standard Q-learning has successfully been shown to predict responses in a variety of 
(non-social) learning tasks, including reversal learning (Jocham et al., 2009). It assumes that 
the choice between two stimuli A and B is determined by action values (Q-values) that are 
associated with each choice option and can vary between 0 and 1. Q-values are updated after 
each choice trial taking into account the reward prediction error δ
r
, that is, the difference 
between the observed outcome (= 1 or 0 in binary learning) and the expected outcome (= 
current Q-value) so that δ
r
 = reward(t) – Q(t). The reward prediction error is additionally 
weighted by the learning rate α
r
 so that in trial t + 1, Q is recalculated by Q(t+1) = Q(t) + α
r 
* 
δ
r
(t).  
Since reward/punishment associations in our task were mutually exclusive, we 
updated Q-values after each trial for both the blue color (Qblue) and the green color (Qgreen), 
with Qgreen = 1 - Qblue. At the start of the private and social learning task, we set both Q-values 
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to 0.5. Before model predictions were tested against the observed choices, we transformed Q-
values into action selection probabilities (Pblue or Pgreen), using a softmax function (Sutton & 
Barto, 1998). The softmax function (see Fig. 2) estimates the probability of the participant 
choosing a specific option in each trial by adjusting Q-values by an estimate of the 
‘temperature’ β (= degree of randomness in the participant’s choices). 
In our social Q-learning variants we modeled observed choices of the other player as a 
‘social prediction error’ δ
s
. Similar to the standard reward prediction error δ
r
, we modeled δ
s
 
as the difference between an internally stored representation of each choice option’s value and 
an external event revising this value. In particular, we defined δ
s
 as the extent of how much 
the observed choice matches or deviates from the participant’s current choice preference as 
defined by the higher of the two current Q-values, i.e.  δ
s
 = observed choice(t) – Q(t): If Qblue 
was higher at the start of trial t (before the other player’s choice was seen and feedback was 
given), observing the other choosing blue resulted in a δ
s
(t)= 1 – Qblue(t), whereas a green 
choice by the other was modeled as δ
s
(t)= 0 – Qblue(t). Vice versa, when Qgreen(t) was higher 
than Qblue(t) at the start of trial t, we defined δ
s
(t)= 0 – Qgreen(t) when the other player chose 
blue and δ
s
(t) = 1 – Qgreen (t) when the other player chose green. As a result, conservative 
choices by the other typically elicited a positive δ
s
 while impulsive choices evoked a negative 
δ
s
 It should be noted that positive (termed ‘conservative’ δ
s
 hereinafter) versus negative δ
s
 
(termed ‘impulsive’ δ
s 
hereinafter) should not be confused with positive versus negative 
reward prediction errors (δ
r
) in the probabilistic learning literature. In contrast to δ
s
 whose 
sign we derived from the correspondence to the dominant choice propensity, the sign of the 
standard δ
r
 is defined based on choice outcome (reward versus punishment). Social prediction 
errors were additionally weighted by the social learning rate α
s
. 
 We used three classes of models, differing in whether and how δ
r
 and δ
s
 were 
combined to update Q-values: (i) Standard (non-social) Q-learning: Q-values were updated 
only by δ
r 
weighted by α
r
 (with α
s
 set to 0),
 
after a choice had been made/outcome had been 
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received (‘Social Ignorer’); (ii) imitative learning: Q-values were determined only by δ
s
 
weighted by α
s 
(with α
r
 set to 0), after the other player’s choice had been observed but before 
one’s own choice was made (‘Blind Follower’), (iii) integrative learning: Q-values were 
updated by both δ
r
 and δ
s
.  
Recent studies showed that with regard to overall performance measures in 
probabilistic reward learning tasks, integrative learning strategies are superior relative to 
purely social (imitative) or non-social (reward-based only) strategies (Burke et al., 2010; 
Selbing, Lindström, & Olsson, 2014). It should be noted though that in the present studies we 
did not aim to examine the general adaptivity of different social/non-social learning strategies 
but rather compared how different types of observed choice behaviors affect the integration of 
social information into learning and thus the degree of social influence (i.e. the frequency of 
following observed choices). Specifically, we examined whether learning rates would reflect 
any biases in the integration of social information, such as increased weighting of 
expectation-conforming (= conservative) choices or increased weighting of choices made by 
similar versus dissimilar others. 
Based on our expectation of differential effects of observed conservative versus 
observed impulsive choices (see 1.2), the integrative model was further differentiated into a 
sub-model that used a single α
s
 to weight conservative and impulsive δ
s 
and a sub-model that 
used different α
s
 for conservative and impulsive δ
s
. Moreover, we distinguished instantaneous 
integrative models (Q-values were updated by δ
s
 instantaneously, that is, after the other 
player’s response had been observed and before one’s own choice was made; in a second step 
the resulting Q-values were then updated by δ
r
 after the outcome had been received) and 
delayed integrative models (Q-values were updated by δ
s
 with a delay, that is, after the 
outcome had been received and after Q-values had been updated by δ
r
). In contrast to the 
instantaneous models, the delayed models were able to capture information about the 
correctness of the other player (the magnitude and sign and thus the differential weighting of 
16 SOCIAL REVERSAL LEARNING  
δ
s
 was determined after Q-values had been updated by the outcome). Note also that we based 
δ
s
 on Q- rather than P-values (action probabilities derived from the softmax function) since 
the latter yielded on average lower goodness-of-fit values (cf. Lindström & Olsson, 2015). 
Figure 2 shows a schematic illustration of the integrative models. 
We used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) based on Log 
Likelihood Estimates (LLE) as an indicator of each model’s ability to predict empirical 
choices. LLEs use the log of the cumulative product of those action probabilities (Pblue or 
Pgreen, see above) that match the actual choice in each trial t: LLE = log(ΠtPchoice(t)). We 
derived LLEs for each participant and model by extracting the highest LLE (= highest 
goodness-of-fit corresponding to the least negative LLE value) obtained from iterations of 
free parameters between 0 and 1 using increments of 0.05. LLEs were then transformed into 
AICs by AIC = -2*LLE + 2*k, where k is the number of free parameters, with lower values 
indicating superior fit. The rationale of the AIC is to penalise models with a higher number of 
free parameters in order to counteract the confounding role of model complexity (more 
complex models usually show a better data fit). AICs and free parameters (reward and social 
learning rates α
r 
and α
s
, temperature β) were further analyzed by repeated-measurement 
ANOVAs and paired t-tests. 
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Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of two integrative models used to predict trial-by-trial choices during 
social reversal learning. (A) Instantaneous integration model. After receiving feedback in trial t0, in 
trial t1 the participant sees the other player either staying with the previous choice or switching to the 
other color. The resulting social prediction error δsocial has a positive (= conservative δsocial) or negative 
(= impulsive δsocial) sign and is instantaneously used to update Qblue(t0) to Qblue(t1)′ taking into account 
the social learning rate αsocial. Qblue(t1)′ then determines the action selection probability Pblue(t1) based 
on a softmax function. After the participant has made his/her choice and the outcome has been 
received in trial t1, Qblue(t1)′ is then updated by the reward prediction error δreward weighted by the 
reward learning rate αreward to Qblue(t1). Qgreen(t1) is computed as 1 - Qblue(t1). (B) Delayed integration 
model. The only difference to the instantaneous integration model is that δsocial of trial t1 is not 
contributing to the action selection probability Pblue(t1)  but becomes only effective after the outcome 
has been obtained, that is, after Qblue(t1) has been updated by δreward to Qblue(t1)′. 
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3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Accuracy after probabilistic errors 
In the trial following the first ProbErr in a reversal episode (+1), participants 
performed better in the conservative condition relative to the private condition, t(31) = 2.00, p 
= 0.027, Cohen’s d = 0.35 (Fig. 3A). We also found a trend-level facilitation for the 
conservative condition in trial +2 after the first ProbErr, t(31)  = 1.58, p = 0.063, d = 0.28. In 
contrast, we did not find a reduction in accuracy in the impulsive condition in the first two 
trials after the first ProbErr, ts < 0.30, ps > 0.38. For ‘later’ ProbErrs in a reversal episode – 
data was collapsed across 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 ProbErrs due to the small number of episodes presenting 
three ProbErrs – we found a delayed benefit, showing increased accuracy in the conservative 
versus private condition in trial +2, t(31) = 2.38, p = 0.012, d = 0.42, but not in trial +1, t(31)  
= 0.62, p = 0.27 (Fig. 3B). Again we did not find an accuracy impairment in the impulsive 
relative to the private condition in trials +1 and +2, ts < 1.0, ps > 0.16.  
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Fig. 3. Choice accuracy (for the truly correct color) as a function of trial position and social influence 
in Study 1. (A-B) Accuracy for trials -3 before to +3 after probabilistic errors (ProbErr, left) and in 
more detail for post-ProbErr trials +1 and +2 (right), split for first (A) and late (second/third, B) 
ProbErrs in a reversal episode. (C) Accuracy for trials -3 before to +3 after reversals (left) and in more 
detail for post-reversal trials +1 and +2 (right). Error bars show standard errors of the mean. 
 
3.2.2 Accuracy after reversals 
Consistent with the post-ProbErr results, social influence was restricted to the 
conservative other. After reversals this led to a decrease of accuracy since the conservative 
player perseverated to the previously correct color. These ‘socially induced perseverations’ 
were apparent in trial +1, t(31) = 1.93, p = 0.032, d = 0.34, and +2, t(31) = 2.26, p = 0.016, d = 
0.40 (Fig. 3C). Observing the impulsive player who switched to the newly correct color did 
not improve accuracy in trials +1 or +2 relative to the private condition, ts < 0.22, ps > 0.41. 
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To summarize, both post-ProbErr and post-reversal results showed that participants frequently 
followed a conservative (non-switching) other player after their choice had been unexpectedly 
punished in the previous trial, while an impulsive player was ignored.  
3.2.3 Computational modeling 
3.2.3.1 Model fit comparisons 
Paired t-tests (two-tailed) showed that all integrative models performed substantially 
better than the standard Q-learning (‘social ignorer’) and imitative (‘blind follower’) models, 
all ts > 2.96, all ps < 0.007 (see Table 1 for an overview of AICs). This replicates previous 
work highlighting that both social (observed choices) and non-social (observed consequences) 
information are dynamically combined during reward (Burke et al., 2010) or aversive 
(Selbing et al., 2014) learning tasks. 
Table 1. Number of free parameters, means (standard deviations) of Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) and learning rate (α
r
 and α
s
) estimates for reward and social 
prediction errors (δ) of all models in Study 1.  
Model 
Free 
parameters 
AIC α
r
 
α
s 
(cons./ 
imp. δ) 
α
s 
(cons. 
δ) 
α
s 
(imp. δ) 
Standard Q-learning 2 
211.96 
(54.89) 
0.45 
(0.08) 
– – – 
Imitative – same α
s
 2 
373.19 
(39.30) 
– 
0.8 
(0.11) 
– – 
Imitative – different α
s
 3 
370.60 
(40.22) 
– – 
0.93 
(0.25) 
0.66 
(0.18) 
Instantaneous 
integration – same α
s
 
3 
205.40 
(54.55) 
0.46 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
– – 
Instantaneous 
integration – different α
s
 
4 
205.54 
(54.53) 
0.46 
(0.07) 
– 
0.09 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
Delayed integration – 
same α
s
 
3 
205.87 
(55.43) 
0.53 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
– – 
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Delayed integration – 
different α
s
 
4 
203.84 
(56.38) 
0.47 
(0.06) 
– 
0.22 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
 
To further analyze the integrative models, we entered their AICs into a repeated-
measurement ANOVA with time of integration (instantaneous vs. delayed) and social 
learning rate (same α
s
 or different α
s
 for conservative and impulsive δ
s
) as factors. We found 
a main effect of social learning rate, F(1, 31) = 4.53, p = 0.041 and an interaction time of 
integration x social learning rate, F(1, 31) = 5.60, p = 0.024, indicating a better fit for delayed 
integration for the models using different learning rates specifically (see Fig. 4). Together 
these results suggest a clear predictive advantage for models integrating reward and social 
information over models relying on one source information. Modeling also provided some 
evidence for a differential integration of observed conservative versus impulsive choices but, 
given the large variability between individual AICs, overall these effects were weak. 
 
Fig 4. Model fit comparisons in Study 1 using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which corrects 
for the number of free parameters. The figure shows the differences ΔAIC between the standard Q-
learning model, which is based on δ
r
 only (‘social ignorer’), and the 4 integrative models in which 
both reward and social information are utilized, with the integration occurring either instantaneously 
or with a delay, and with applying either the same or different learning rates to conservative/impulsive 
δ
s
. A larger ΔAIC indicates superior performance. Error bars show standard errors of the difference. 
 
3.2.3.2 Social learning rates 
We further examined individuals’ social learning rates (α
s
) derived from the free 
parameter estimations associated with the best performing model (delayed integration of δ
s
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and δ
r
, different α
s
 for conservative versus impulsive δ
s
). Paired t-tests showed that α
s
 was 
substantially higher for conservative δ
s
 (M = 0.22, 95% CI [0.17, 0.27]) versus impulsive δ
s
 
(M = 0.05, CI [0.02, 0.07]), t(31) = 6.92, p < 0.001, d = 1.22, suggesting that participants 
weighted others’ responses more strongly if they conformed with their current choice 
preference. One might argue that conservative δ
s
 received a larger α
s
 because they
 
were 
smaller in magnitude than impulsive δ
s
 so that net effects on Q-values were balanced. 
However, the average product of conservative δ
s
 and conservative α
s
 (i.e. the net effect on Q-
values) was still larger than then average product of impulsive δ
s
 and impulsive α
s
: Mean 
conservative α
s
 x mean conservative δ
s
 =  0.22 x 0.44= 0.10; mean impulsive α
s
 x mean 
impulsive δ
s
 = 0.05 x 0.57 = 0.03. To summarize, the other player’s choice was more strongly 
weighted for conservative versus impulsive social prediction errors, mirroring the 
‘conservative bias’ observed at the level of accuracy data.  
3.2.3.3 Incidental similarity 
We next tested for increased social learning rates (derived from the best-performing 
delayed, α
s
 differentiated model) in those participants who were observing a similar versus 
dissimilar player. ANOVA of α
s
 values using group (similar versus dissimilar other) and type 
of social prediction error (conservative versus impulsive) showed a significant main effect of 
type of α
s
 (with higher α
s
 for conservative δ
s
), F(1, 30) = 54.16, p < 0.001. We also found a 
marginally significant interaction between group and type of α
s
, F(1, 30) = 4.04, p = 0.05. 
Follow-up tests (one-tailed independent-samples t-tests) revealed that for the best performing 
model the similar-other group showed a higher α
s
 for conservative δ
s
 relative to the dissimilar-
other group (see Fig. 5), t(31)  = 2.06 , p = 0.024, d = 0.72. In contrast, similarity did not lead 
to a higher α
s
 for impulsive δ
s
, t(31) = 0.12, p = 0.45. Thus, similarity acted to exaggerate the 
bias towards expectation-consistent responses of the other player specifically. Importantly, we 
found no group differences for similarity in any of the other learning parameters, α
r
: similar 
other: M = 0.47, SD = 0.07; dissimilar other: M = 0.47, SD = 0.06; t(30) = 0.30, p = 0.77; β: 
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similar other: M = 0.19, SD = 0.08; dissimilar other: M = 0.19, SD = 0.06; t(30) = 0.05, p = 
0.96. To summarize, interpersonal similarity boosted learning from conservative social 
prediction errors but did not lead to a general increase of social influence. 
 
Fig. 5. Mean learning rates for δ
s
 derived from the best-fitting computational model and split for 
direction (conservative versus impulsive) of the δ
s
 and the two groups of participants who observed 
another player either sharing (similar-other group) or not sharing (dissimilar-other group) their own 
birthday. Error bars show standard errors of the mean. 
 
4. Study 2 
The aim of Study 2 was to control for non-social responses biases resulting from our 
method of presenting choices made by another player by a lateral, visual cue. In particular, 
marking one of the two choice options by a white frame may have biased responses at a 
simple perceptual level through exogenous spatial cueing. In Study 2 we used the same 
paradigm as in Study 1 – showing a white box around one of the colors that switched or did 
not switch to the other color after punishments – without presenting the social cover story (see 
3.1.3) before the task. A spatial cueing account would predict that spatial cueing alone 
(without social information) will lead to similar results as in Study 1, specifically an accuracy 
difference between the conditions in which the correct versus incorrect response was cued 
(i.e., increased accuracy for conservative trials relative to impulsive trials after PEs and vice 
versa after reversals). In contrast, if omitting social information removes or reduces the 
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accuracy difference between the differentially cued trials, the effects observed in the previous 
study could be attributed to social-cognitive processes. 
4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Participants 
19 students (15 female, 4 male; mean age M = 20.67 years, SD = 1.37) completed the 
reversal learning task and received course credits or payment for their participation. All 
participants provided written informed consent, and the protocol had been approved by the 
ethics committee of the School of Psychology, Cardiff University. 
4.1.2 Materials and procedure 
The reversal learning paradigm was identical to Study 1 with the exception of the 
initial task instruction. Instead of being informed about a randomly selected other player 
whose responses participants would observe in the social block, they were simply told that 
they would see additional visual information without any further specification of the nature of 
this information. As in the previous study, order of the private and ‘social’ block was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
4.1.3 Data analysis 
We calculated % correct choices for the two trials following ProbErrs and reversals as 
a function of the ‘choice’ displayed by the white frame (stay [=conservative] versus switch 
[=impulsive]).  As a spatial cueing account would predict maximal differences for trials 
cueing opposite responses, we computed the difference between stay- and switch-cued trials 
and directly contrasted this measure with the same difference calculated for Study 1, using 
between-group comparisons (one-tailed two-sample t-tests). In addition, we compared 
average accuracy for stay-cued and switch-cued trials with ‘private’ performance (no lateral 
visual cue) in the non-social control experiment (Study 2) separately, using paired t-tests. 
4.2 Results 
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As illustrated in Figure 6, reversal learning performance levels in Study 2 were 
comparable to those in Study 1. Importantly, we found cross-study evidence that accuracy 
differences between the conservative and impulsive condition in critical trials (stay-cues 
versus switch-cues) were smaller in the non-social experiment (Study 2) relative to the social 
version of the same paradigm (Study 1). The difference reached significance for post-PE trials 
+2  t(49) = 1.70, p = 0.048, and trend-level when accuracy was computed across PE positions 
and +1/ +2 trials, t(49) = 1.43, p = 0.080. For post-PE trials +1 and post-reversal trials, 
differences did not reach significance, ts < 1.01, ps > 0.15.  
Separate analyses of accuracy data in Study 2 comparing conservative/impulsive trials 
with private trials provided further evidence that cueing one of the choice options did not 
modulate choice accuracy. No significant differences between the social and the private 
conditions emerged for post-PE trials: First ProbErr: all ts < 0.73, all ps > 0.47; later 
ProbErrs: conservative trial +1 versus private +1: t(18) = 0.90, p = 0.38, conservative +2 
versus private +2:  t(18) = 1.19, p = 0.25, impulsive +1 versus private + 1: t(18) = 1.90, p = 
0.074, impulsive +2 versus private + 2: t(18) = 0.57, p = 0.58. Moreover, in the first trial after 
reversals accuracy was not reduced by observed ‘perseverations’ (conservative condition), 
t(18) = 0.47, p = 0.64, nor was it improved by cued switches (impulsive condition),  t(18) = 
0.46, p = 0.65, relative to the private block. Cued switch responses did also not alter accuracy 
in trial +2 after reversals,  t(18) = 0.02, p = 0.98. The only result comparable to Study 1 was a 
decrease in performance in the conservative condition relative to the private condition in trial 
+2 after reversals, t(18) = 1.88, p = 0.077 (two-tailed).  
However, we suspect that this influence on choice accuracy was due to a residual 
attribution of social properties to the spatial cue by the participants themselves (6 participants 
actually reported during debriefing after the task that they believed that the white box showed 
responses by another player). Moreover, while spatial cueing predicts increased accuracy in 
the conservative relative to the private condition after probabilistic errors, it predicts an 
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analogous reduction in accuracy for the impulsive condition (which cues switch responses) in 
those trials, which we did not find in either study. Overall, results of Study 2 thus suggest that 
presenting choice cues in a non-social context removes (or at least substantially reduces) the 
specific effects resulting from the experimental manipulations in the previous studies, 
providing supporting evidence for their social nature. 
 
Fig. 6. Choice accuracy as a function of trial position and lateral cue in the non-social control 
experiment (Study 2). (A-B) Accuracy for trials -3 before to +3 after probabilistic errors (ProbErr), 
shown for first (A) and late (B) ProbErrs in a reversal episode. (C) Accuracy for trials -3 before to +3 
after reversals. Error bars show standard errors of the mean. 
 
5. Study 3 
The first goal of Study 3 was to replicate the general finding of social influence on 
reversal learning (Study 1) using data from a different and larger sample. The second goal of 
Study 3 was to further investigate the differential effects of observed conservative versus 
impulsive choices. Specifically, by reducing the number of trials per reversal episode, Study 3 
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allowed to examine the role of reversal volatility on weighting different types of observed 
choice behavior. Thus, it is possible that the influence of observed impulsive choices 
increases with increased reversal volatility, as higher volatility may favor exploratory choice 
behavior. No similarity manipulation was included in Study 2. 
5.1 Methods 
5.1.1 Participants 
Data were acquired as part of a multimodal genetic imaging project at Cardiff 
University in which 100 volunteers performed various cognitive tasks while undergoing 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). All participants provided written informed 
consent, and the protocol had been approved by the ethics committee of the School of 
Psychology, Cardiff University. Reversal learning data from 7 participants were incomplete 
due to technical problems. All data from the remaining sample (N = 93; 59 female, 34 male, 
24.39 years ± 4.54 [SD]) were used for analysis.  
5.1.2 Materials and procedure 
The overall task structure was identical to the first study but reversals occurred after a 
fewer number of trials (pseudo-randomized between 7-11, mean episode length = 9 trials). In 
addition, the following task structure was implemented: (i) The task was split into three 
blocks, one private block and two social blocks (social blocks were always presented 
successively), each containing 12 reversal episodes. Each of the two social blocks contained 6 
conservative and 6 impulsive episodes. (ii) Due the shorter reversal episodes we reduced the 
number of ProbErr trials: There were either one or two ProbErrs between two reversals; per 
condition (private, conservative, impulsive) 8 reversal episodes contained 1 ProbErr and 4 
episodes contained two ProbErrs. (iii) In the social blocks half of the post-ProbErr trials (+1) 
showed conservative choices made by the other, and half of the trials showed impulsive 
choices. (iv) After each conservative reversal episode, the other player perseverated for one 
trial (+1), while after each impulsive episode the other player made an impulsive (correct) 
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choice. (v) The task was not self-paced as in the previous study but stimuli (for instance, 
presentation of other player’s response or reward feedback) had randomized durations in the 
range of 0.75 s to several seconds.  
5.1.3 Data analysis 
We used the same methods as in Study 1 to calculate average accuracy scores. 
Similarly, the same algorithms as in the first experiment were applied to model trial-by-trial 
choices. The only modifications of the existing functions were as follows: (i) We added a 
mathematical rule dealing with ‘miss’ responses – in contrast to the (self-paced) first study, 
misses could occur in Study 3 as choice cue and feedback stimulus were presented for a 
limited amount of time. To keep the number of learning trials contributing to LLE scores 
comparable, an action probability Pblue/Pgreen of 0.5 (that is, indecisiveness between blue and 
green choice) was assumed for missed trials. (ii) The sign of δ
s
 (positive [= conservative] 
versus negative [= impulsive]) was not determined by the currently higher Q-value (Qblue 
versus Qgreen) but by the more frequent choice of the participant in the last three trials before 
the predicted trial within a given reversal episode: If the dominant choice in the last three 
trials was ‘blue’ at the start of trial t, observing the other choosing ‘blue’ resulted in a δ
s
(t)= 1 
– Qblue(t), while a ‘green’ choice by the other resulted in as δ
s
(t)= 0 – Qblue(t). Vice versa, 
when the dominant choice in the last three trials was ‘green’, observing the other choosing 
‘blue’ resulted in δ
s
(t) = 0 – Qgreen(t) while a ‘green’ choice led to δ
s
(t) = 1 – Qgreen (t).  
5.2. Results 
5.2.1 Accuracy 
Despite the changes in task structure relative to Study 1, paired t-tests confirmed 
selective facilitation in the conservative condition after ProbErr trials, showing an accuracy 
benefit in the two trials after the first (trial +1: t(92) = 5.51, p < 0.001, d = 0.57; +2: t(92)  = 
3.15, p = 0.001, d = 0.33) and second ProbErr (+1: t(92) = 4.38, p < 0.001, d = 0.45; +2: t(92) 
= 4.37, p < 0.001, d = 0.45), relative to the private condition (see Fig. 7). Again, the (wrong) 
29 SOCIAL REVERSAL LEARNING  
impulsive player did not reduce performance after the first (+1: t(92) = -1.05, p = 0.15; +2: 
t(92) = 2.02, p = 0.98) or second ProbErr (+1: t(92) = -0.86, p = 0.20; +2: t(92) = 0.49, p = 
0.69). For accuracy after reversals, we replicated the detrimental effect in the conservative 
condition in trial +1 in which the other player perseverated to the previously correct color, 
t(92) = -2.93, p = 0.002, d = 0.30. Importantly, though, we also found a facilitatory influence 
of the (correct) impulsive player in trial +1 after reversals showing improved accuracy relative 
to the private condition, t(92)  = 3.98, p < 0.001, d = 0.41. 
 
Fig. 7. Choice accuracy (for the truly correct color) as a function of trial position and social influence 
in Study 2. (A) Accuracy for trials +1 and +2 after the first probabilistic error (ProbErr) in a reversal 
episode. (B) Accuracy for trials +1 and +2 after the second ProbErr in a reversal episode. (C) 
Accuracy for trials +1 and +2 after reversals. Error bars show standard errors of the mean. 
 
5.2.2 Computational modeling  
Modeling results replicated lower AICs and thus better goodness-of-fit for all four 
integrative models, relative to the imitative models (all ts > 9.11, all ps < 0.001, all ds > 0.95. 
Compared to the standard (reward-based) Q-learning model (AIC = 86.28), both 
instantaneous integration models achieved better fit (same α
s
: AIC = 84.56, t(92) = 3.57, p = 
0.001, d = 0.37; different α
s
: AIC = 85.05, t(92) = 2.63, p = 0.010, d = 0.27) while the AICs of 
the delayed integration models did not significantly differ from the standard Q-learning model 
(same α
s
: AIC = 85.92, t(92) = 1.43, p = 0.157; different α
s
: AIC = 86.55, t(92) = -1.01, p = 
0.319). In contrast to Study 1, ANOVA of the four integrative models showed a better fit for 
models using the same α
s
 for conservative versus impulsive δ
s
 (main effect social learning 
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rate, F(1, 92) = 29.76, p < 0.001) and for the instantaneous versus delayed models (main 
effect time of integration: F(1, 92) = 10.07, p = 0.002). One account for the better fit of 
models assuming that the same learning rate is instantaneously applied to conservative and 
impulsive prediction errors – rather than assuming a biased and delayed weighting of 
conservative choices as in Study 1 – is the relative increase in responses following observed 
impulsive choices after reversals in Study 3 (see 5.2.1). This likely led to overall higher 
weights for impulsive δ
s
 (and thus more balanced weighting of the two types of observed 
choices) in the iterative free parameter optimization. Such increased learning from impulsive 
choices was most likely a consequence of introducing a more volatile reward environment 
with more frequent reversals. This could have amplified participants’ exploration propensity 
(i.e., the spontaneous testing of the alternative, non-rewarded choice option) specifically 
towards the anticipated end of each reversal episode. Such an interpretation is consistent with 
the choice accuracy results in Study 3 (see 5.2.1) showing a conservative bias after ProbErrs 
but an equal influence of conservative and impulsive choices after reversals. 
In sum, Study 3 replicated the substantial social influences during observational 
reversal learning from Study 1 using data from a larger, independent sample. Moreover, Study 
3 provides evidence that the bias towards selective learning from observed conservative 
behavior is mitigated in a less stable decisional context. 
6. Simulations 
The goal of the simulation analysis was to explore the adaptivity of the choice 
behaviors implemented in our computational models within the present task framework. 
Specifically, we wanted to compare relative usefulness of the different types of integrative 
learning (such as differential versus identical weighting of conservative versus impulsive 
choices), using iterations of learning rate levels and a large number of randomly generated 
reversal learning sequences. 
6.1 Methods 
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Random learning sequences were constructed within the general design constraints of 
the present paradigm but included stochastic reward frequencies at different probability 
levels: We constructed sequences to have 36 reversal episodes with a random length of 7-15 
trials each. Within each reversal episode the reward-punishment probability for the correct 
stimulus was either 0.8/0.2 or 0.6/0.4, and vice versa 0.2/0.8 or 0.4/0.6 for the incorrect 
stimulus. The other player’s response was simulated to be the correct choice (according to the 
reversal episode) in all trials except in some of the trials following punishments: In half of the 
reversal episodes the other player switched to the incorrect stimulus after punishments 
(impulsive behavior), in half of the other episodes, the other player stayed with the previously 
correct choice (conservative behavior), with the order of conservative/impulsive episodes 
randomly determined. In addition, after conservative episodes the other played perseverated to 
the previously correct color for two trials. Average performance of each model was computed 
for 10,000 permutations (sequences) of the outlined randomization parameters. For each 
sequence and model we calculated Q-based action selection probabilities Pblue and Pgreen 
according to each model’s specific learning algorithms and then computed average % correct 
choices for each learning rate (α
r 
 or α
s
) iterated between 0.05 and 1 (0.05 increments). To 
reduce the number of free parameters and across models, βs were set to a fixed value of 0.2 
corresponding to its average estimated value in data of Study 1. Similarly, for accuracy 
simulations of the imitative and integrative models α
r
 was set to a constant value of 0.5. 
6.2 Results 
For the high reward probability condition (0.8/0.2), the main results were as follows: 
Standard Q-learning (‘social ignorer’) reached high accuracy levels of nearly 75% if 
sufficiently high learning rates were applied (> 0.3). Integrating reward and social information 
reached comparable accuracy only when the same α
s
 was applied to conservative and 
impulsive δ
s
 and when the information was integrated instantaneously rather than with a delay 
(Fig. 8B-D). Performance based on instantaneous integration  and the same α
s
 peaked at an α
s
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of around 0.25, i.e., at substantially higher levels than the modeled α
s
 for negative  δ
s
 (0.05), 
suggesting that participants in Study 1 had underweighted impulsive δ
s
 to optimize 
performance. Imitative learning did not lead to accuracies levels as high as those of standard-
Q learning and instantaneous integration (same α
s
). The worst performing model was 
instantaneous integration with different α
s
 (Fig. 8C), showing accuracies on average 10% 
lower than the most successful models.  
In the simulations with low reward probability accuracy was substantially decreased 
across all learning models compared to those with high reward probability. Imitative learning 
outperformed all other models while performance of standard Q-learning dropped markedly, 
which can be attributed to the decreased reliability of reward information. Again, within the 
integrative models we found optimal performance for instantaneous integration using the 
same α
s
. In general, accuracy in the low reward probability simulations increased 
progressively with increased weighting of social information.  
The question arises why these effects – higher adaptivity of ignoring social 
information when reward information is reliable, higher adaptivity of social learning when 
reward information is unreliable – are compatible with the notion that the observed agent is 
exposed to the same reward sequence as the observing agent. However, it should be 
emphasized that in our simulations the observed agent did not “learn” from the reward 
outcomes in a technical sense; instead choice behavior (and thus accuracy) was predetermined 
(see methods 6.1: 100% accuracy in standard trials, fixed number of errors after 
punishments). Thus, simulated accuracy of social learning was only as good as the fixed 
validity of social information allowed it to be. General inferences about the adaptivity of 
social learning thus cannot be drawn. Importantly though, as we mapped the validity of social 
information in our simulations onto its manipulation in our empirical studies, the simulation 
results can be used to evaluate whether participants under- or over-utilized reward and social 
information in the present decision-making framework: Together, our simulation results 
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suggest that in our paradigm, which was characterized by relatively high reward probabilities, 
individuals generally over-utilized social information, even though adding social prediction 
errors to the information that could be gained from reward alone was not necessarily adaptive.  
On the other hand, participants under-utilized information from impulsive choices: 
Simulations demonstrated that social information improved performance only when both 
conservative and impulsive δ
s
 were integrated with equal weights, with an optimal α
s
 of 
around 0.1-0.3 for both types of prediction errors. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Results of the simulation analysis. Average accuracy of the different computational models was 
computed across 10,000 randomly generated reversal learning sequences (each containing 36 reversal 
episodes with 7-15 trials) that included both social and reward information. Correct responses were 
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rewarded probabilistically and accuracy was computed for high probability (P reward = 0.8, P 
punishment = 0.2) and low probability (0.6/0.4) sequences separately. Social information contained in 
random order conservative (cons) choices in half of the reversal episodes and impulsive choices in the 
other half. Average accuracy was calculated for different reward (standard Q-learning) or social 
learning rates (imitative and integrative models) varying between 0.05 and 1. For the integrative 
models using two α
s
, accuracy was computed for low (= 0.1), medium (= 0.5) and high (= 0.9) levels 
of conservative α
s
 and an impulsive α
s
 varying between 0.05 and 1. (A) Results for the non-integrative 
models (standard Q- and imitative learning), (B)-(D) results for the integrative models. 
 
7. Discussion 
The present results demonstrate that observing others critically influences learning of 
reversing reward contingencies and that individuals integrate an observed agent’s choice into 
learning in form of a ‘social prediction error’ (δ
s
). Specifically, δ
s
 in combination with the 
standard reward prediction error (δ
r
) jointly explain participants’ choices better than models 
that assume that people rely on either of these sources of information alone (i.e. ‘social 
ignoring’ or ‘blind following’).  
Our data demonstrate and replicate the substantial impact of the observed agent’s type 
of choice behavior: Learners follow another player’s choice readily if the choice matches their 
recent choice preference (a ‘conservative’ choice), even this led to a higher number of 
perseveration errors. The influence of observed conservative choices was pervasive, affecting 
decisions after ProbErrs and reversals and conditions with moderate (Study 1) and high 
(Study 3) reversal volatility. In contrast, observed impulsive choices affected decisions only 
after reversals and if reversal volatility was sufficiently high (Study 3).  
Such selective influence of observed conservative choices – which we demonstrate 
despite the participants' knowledge that reward contingencies could reverse – has implications 
for real-life choice situations in which well-established behavioral routines exist that need to 
be revised or overcome. Our results suggest that in such situations social models in the 
environment are capable to reinforce the maintenance of established choice preferences, even 
though these choices are no longer rewarded or the reward is experienced as less pleasant. 
Such scenarios can be easily mapped, for instance, onto the role of peer models in food choice 
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behavior during development but also onto the role of social factors in changing unhealthy 
habits during adulthood.  
The notion of a selective influence of (conservative) choices that match established 
preferences is consistent with a ‘confirmation bias’, reflecting the tendency to selectively seek 
or use information that is consistent with one’s preconceptions (Nickerson, 1998). The 
confirmation bias has been recognized as a ubiquitous phenomenon manifesting itself in a 
variety of domains, ranging from attention to memory and formal reasoning (Nickerson, 
1998). In the context of reward-based decision-making, a confirmation bias towards verbal 
information given before learning, was shown to modulate the weighting of outcomes 
received in the feedback phase (Doll, Hutchison, & Frank, 2011). Moreover, there is an open 
debate on the extent to which  cognitive biases, such as the confirmation bias, reflect mental 
‘flaws’ or have adaptive utility and even lead to more accurate responses than unbiased 
responses (Gigerenzer, 1991). Our tasks were not designed to allow a quantification of the 
utility of following social information in general as we deliberately presented sub-optimal 
choice behavior. Nonetheless, our simulation results suggest that integrating social 
information in the present experimental framework did not necessarily help participants to 
maximize their earnings, especially not when participants weighted observed conservative 
choices more than impulsive choices. It is possible, though, that following conservative 
choices evoked a subjective reduction of uncertainty (not measured in the present studies), 
which has been shown to mediate social influence in situations of limited stimulus 
information (McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993). The idea of selective weighting of 
social information to achieve ‘re-assurance’ is also consistent with recent work on the 
evolutionary bases of conformity (i.e. adoption of behaviors displayed by groups) and social 
learning, highlighting that participants’ confidence and uncertainty critically affect the 
strength of social influences (Morgan et al., 2012). 
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Another recent study pertinent to our findings showed that social influence exerted by 
another observed learner during probabilistic decision-making increased with the observable 
skill level of the demonstrator (Selbing et al., 2014). Such selective influence of competent 
others fits well with animal research showing that successful models are more likely to be 
copied (Laland, 2004). In our study, we balanced performance (inferred skill) levels between 
the conservative and impulsive conditions, which enabled us to extend these findings by 
showing that even subjective criteria not linked to competencies, in our case the incidental 
similarity conferred by a shared birthday, mediate social learning. These effects are consistent 
with other work showing that incidental similarity increases compliance with requests (Burger 
et al., 2004) or behavioral mimicry (Guéguen & Martin, 2009). Incidental similarity is 
assumed to elicit a coarse form of information processing guiding decisions based on 
heuristics rather than careful considerations of the choice options (Burger et al., 2004). 
Specifically, salient features indicating similarity will shift attention to other features 
perceived as similar rather than attributes indicating dissimilarity (Mussweiler, 2003). In 
accordance with this theory, incidental similarity in our study selectively increased α
s
 for 
conservative δ
s
, that is, similar players induced an even stronger conservative bias than 
dissimilar players. The modulation by interpersonal similarity also supports the notion that the 
current pattern of results can be attributed to social-cognitive processes rather than arising 
from simple associative learning. Simple associative learning should have resulted in a similar 
conservative bias in both similarity groups which we did not find.  
Consistent with our results, a social modulation of reward-based decision-making was 
recently shown in two-armed bandit tasks with fixed (non-reversed) reward probabilities 
(Burke et al., 2010), instrumental conditioning with liquid rewards (Cooper et al., 2012) and 
advice-based tasks (Behrens et al., 2008; Biele et al., 2011). Furthermore, brain imaging 
findings suggest that expectancy violations in the social domain engage similar brain regions 
as prediction errors during reinforcement learning (Harris & Fiske, 2010). Other brain 
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imaging work has supported the existence of an ‘action prediction error’ (Burke et al., 2010), 
reflecting the difference between predicted and observed choices of another agent and 
underpinned by regionally specific activation changes in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
Critically, in contrast to our paradigm, these studies did not compare different attributes and 
choice behaviors displayed by the observed agent that modulate these computational signals. 
Accordingly, ‘action prediction errors’ were modeled as non-signed variables (Burke et al., 
2010). Another type of social prediction error has been described for the observation of 
(independently varied) outcomes received by the other agent and associated with neural 
responses in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Burke et al., 2010) and dorsal striatum (Cooper 
et al., 2012). In our study, we did not vary outcomes for real and observed players 
independently, making the ‘observational outcome prediction error’ (Burke et al., 2010) 
temporally overlap with the (experiential) reward prediction error. Such joint outcomes are 
assumed to signal prediction errors related to the ‘trustworthiness’ of the other player and 
recruit brain regions involved in social evaluation (Behrens et al., 2008). As outlined above, 
these social-evaluative factors related to the other’s competence or trustworthiness may have 
been captured by the delay component in our models.  
We used comparatively simple Q-learning algorithms to model our data. Q-learning 
has successfully been applied to predict choices during reversal learning by other groups 
(Jocham et al., 2009). While more sophisticated approaches like Hidden Markov models may 
alter overall goodness-of-fit results (Hampton, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2006), we do not 
expect that they would change the pattern of results as observed here (e.g. relative 
explanatory advantage for models with integrative strategies). A promising perspective for 
future studies would also be to use dynamic rather than fixed weighting factors to model 
socially mediated decision-making. For instance in Pearce-Hall models (Pearce & Hall, 
1980), instead of assigning a constant learning rate that scales prediction errors throughout the 
learning process, the amount of learning is dependent on attentional deployment 
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(“associability”), which in turn varies depending on prediction errors experienced in 
preceding trials. 
8. Conclusions and Implications 
Our findings highlight the pivotal role of social influence in human cognition, 
demonstrating that even basic mechanisms such as reversal learning are affected by 
observation of other people’s behavior. We show that in scenarios implementing decisional 
uncertainty by reversing reward contingencies individuals combine social and non-social 
information to guide their decision. However, individuals learn more strongly from 
information that is provided by observed agents who are perceived as similar, even if this 
perception is based on minimalistic and task-irrelevant information (shared birthday). 
Interpersonal similarity is a potent trigger and modulator of various social behaviors ranging 
from altruistic punishment (Mussweiler & Ockenfels, 2013) to evaluations of others 
(Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008). Our results suggest that that similarity modulates even more 
basic cognitive processes, such as reversal learning. 
Learners generally exhibited a ‘conservative bias’ towards social cues that conform to 
their preconceptions. We demonstrate how these biases can be incorporated into formalized 
learning models. Knowledge about such social trajectories in decision-making is important for 
psychological research into the determinants of human choices in natural contexts, especially 
if choices are influenced by others, such as in voting or consumer behavior. Moreover, the 
right balance of reward-based versus social-observational learning is often crucial for the 
success or failure of education programs or interventions for behavioral change. The formal 
models proposed here can inform and optimize the design of such programs and interventions, 
specifically if the approaches include ‘role model’ behavior to promote learning.  
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